Western scholars generally agree that early ḥadīth critics limited their authentication of ḥadīths to examining isnāds. e argument that these critics took the matn into account has relied on material of dubious reliability or on works produced after the formative period of the Sunni ḥadīth tradition. By providing examples of matn criticism from the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries, I prove that Sunni ḥadīth critics did in fact engage in matn criticism; and I argue that these critics consciously manufactured the image of exclusive focus on the isnād in an effort to ward off attacks by rationalist opponents. By demonstrating a high correlation between the ḥadīths found in early books of transmitter criticism and those found in later books of forged ḥadīth with explicit matn criticism, I show that early critics engaged in matn criticism far more often than appears to have been the case, disguising this activity in the language of isnād criticism.
Introduction
Western scholars have accepted that early Muslim ḥadīth scholars focused their efforts to determine the authenticity of reports at tributed to the Prophet principally on their chains of transmission (isnād pl. asānīd) and ignored the key component of modern historical investigation: the contents of the reports themselves. Western scholars have been entirely justified in this conclusion, as participants in the first four centuries of the Sunni ḥadīth tradition actively touted their obsession with the formal aspects of isnād criticism to the exclusion of any noteworthy interest in criticizing the contents of ḥadīths. e efforts of some Western scholars and modern Muslim apologists to prove that early ḥadīth critics did in fact look beyond the isnād have thus regularly foundered on the lack of any exculpatory evidence from the early Islamic period.
In this article, I reevaluate our outlook on the methods of Sunni ḥadīth critics in the formative 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries, which encompassed the careers of influential critics such as Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and ʿAlī b. ʿUmar al-Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995). First, I will provide examples of early critics explicitly rejecting ḥadīths as fraudulent on the grounds that their contents were unacceptable, proving that content criticism was an established component of their critical arsenal. 1 Second, I will demonstrate that what has appeared to be the critically obtuse edifice of the early Sunni ḥadīth tradition-with its evident inability to perceive glaring anachronism or illogical meanings-does not accurately represent the reality of early ḥadīth criticism. Rather, an indifference to the contents of ḥadīths was an image consciously manufactured by early Sunni ḥadīth critics as an essential part of the cult of methodology they created around the isnād in the face of their rationalist opponents. Finally, I will demonstrate that when the Sunni ḥadīth tradition openly began to shift its attention from isnād criticism to 1) In discussions of ḥadīth criticism, the term 'matn criticism' has become conventional for indicating criticism of the text of the ḥadīth (as opposed to criticism of the chain of transmission, or isnād criticism). I believe the term 'content criticism' more accurately represents what Western scholars have meant by matn criticism, namely the notion that something in the contents or meaning of the ḥadīth is problematic. An early Muslim ḥadīth critic could criticize the matn of a ḥadīth without ever touching upon its meaning; a critic like al-Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995) might object to the wording of one narration of a Prophetic tradition because it deviated from a more established version without the problematic narration's meaning differing at all. Of course, the term 'content criticism' here has no relation to the 'content criticism (Sachkritik) ' content criticism in the 6th/12th century, ḥadīth critics drew directly on the material that earlier critics ostensibly had criticized for isnād flaws. e significant correlation between the material that later critics rejected for content reasons and early isnād criticisms suggests that early ḥadīth scholars employed content criticism far more often than would appear.
e State of the Field on Early Ḥadīth Criticism: Too Early or Too Late
Western scholars of Islam can hardly be blamed for concluding that early ḥadīth critics focused on isnād criticism to the exclusion of content criticism. Indeed, Islamic modernists such as Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935 ) and Jamal al-Banna have seconded this Orientalist critique. ) did sometimes consciously focus on the forgery (waḍʿ) of ḥadīths, but this was done through brief lists of transmitters known to be prominent forgers. 5 It was the inimitable Ignaz Goldziher who first deduced from this evidence that Muslim scholars investigated reports only "in respect of their outward form [,] and judgment of the value of the contents depends on the judgment of the correctness of the isnād." Even if the text of a ḥadīth is replete with suspicious material, "Nobody is allowed to say: 'because the matn contains a logical contradiction or historical absurdity I doubt the correctness of the isnād.'" From this Goldziher concludes that "Muslim critics have no feeling for even the crudest anachronisms provided that the isnād is correct." He intimates that the Muslim religious worldview fosters such critical charity, for the Prophet's divinely granted knowledge of the future explains any anachronisms in his ḥadīths. Alfred Guillaume seconded Goldziher's conclusions. "Hadith," he states, "was not criticized from the point of view of what was inherently reasonable and to be regarded as worthy of credence, but from a consideration of the reputation which the guarantors of the tradition bore."
7 "On the other hand," he adds, "if the subjectmatter (matn) contained an obvious absurdity or an anachronism there was no ground for rejecting the hadith if the isnād was sound." Even those Western scholars who do note that Muslim ḥadīth critics heeded the meaning of a ḥadīth when examining its authenticity include only vague allusions to this sensitivity to content.
10 When Western scholars have pursued their discussion of content criticism further, their evidence is either of questionable reliability or concerns sources much later than the formative period of ḥadīth criticism from the 2nd/8th to the 4th/10th centuries. e late Nabia Abbott points out that isnād criticism did not establish itself until after the outbreak of the Fitna (most likely the Second Civil War) and that prior to that the Companions of the Prophet had relied on content criticism to verify attributions to Muḥammad.
11 e evidence that Abbott adduces, however, is problematic. ere are indeed famous reports of the Prophet's wife ʿĀʾisha rejecting Ibn ʿUmar's statement that the Prophet warned mourners that a dead relative would be punished for his family's excessive mourning over him because she believed that it violated the Qurʾānic principle that 'no bearer of burdens bears the burdens of another (lā taziru wāzirat un wizra ukhrā) (Qurʾān 53:38).' 12 In another famous report, ʿĀʾisha upbraids a Companion who said that the Prophet told the Muslims that their prayer is invalidated if a woman, a black dog or a donkey passes in front of them. "You have compared us to donkeys and dogs!" she retorts. "By God I saw the Prophet (ṣ) praying with me lying on the bed between him and the direction of prayer…!" 13 Ibn ʿAbbās reportedly objected to Abū Hurayra reporting that the Prophet had said that Muslims must perform ablutions after eating food cooked by fire. Ibn While Abbott drew on material that ostensibly predated the development of ḥadīth criticism, other scholars affirming the practice of content criticism in the ḥadīth tradition have relied on evidence that post-dates the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries. John Burton states that "criticism of the matn was not so rare as is sometimes claimed," but the one example he provides comes from the work 18 ese authors in turn derived this list from the earliest Sunni ḥadīth scholar to introduce the notion of formal criteria for uncovering a forged ḥadīth by reference to its contents, the 5th/11th-century ḥadīth master al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/ 1071).
In his monumental treatise on the science of ḥadīth collection and criticism, al-Kifāya fī ʿilm uṣūl al-riwāya, al-Khaṭīb begins his discussion of forged ḥadīths with the classical rationalist division of reports: (1) reports whose truth is known immediately (mutawātir), (2) reports whose falsity is known immediately and (3) reports whose authenticity can be known only after study (the bulk of the ḥadīth corpus). Ḥadīths that are immediately evident as false are identified by one of the following indications: first, they contradict reason (al-ʿuqūl), for example, the statement that no Creator exists. Second, the ḥadīth contradicts the Qurʾān, a widely established precedent of the Prophet (al-sunna al-mutawātira) or a report that the Muslim community has agreed upon (ijmāʿ) as being authentic. ird, the report conveys information that is so essential for Muslims that God would not allow it to be reported by a means other than one that assured its certainty. Finally, a report about some evident, un mistakable event that, if it had occurred, would have necessarily been described via widely transmitted reports. 19 e first two criteria identify ḥadīths that contradict sources that the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarī schools considered epistemologically certain, namely the precepts of reason, the Qurʾān, established sunna and the consensus of the Muslim community.
20 e third and fourth identify ḥadīths that violate principles that Sunni legal theorists also considered epistemologically compelling: God's rules (al-ʿāda) for how a Prophet's message and human society in general function.
is formalized epistemological ranking would have seemed very foreign to Ibn Ḥanbal or al-Bukhārī, who shunned rationalist discourse and whose methods of ḥadīth criticism never resembled it. Not surprisingly, al-Khaṭīb's criteria were originally developed by Ḥanafī rationalist scholars of the 3rd/9th century and later adopted by the Ashʿarī tradition of epistemology. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449) and al-Suyūṭī inform us that al-Khaṭīb adopted these content criteria from one of the founders of the Ashʿarī school, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), one of al-Khaṭīb's sources in his al-Kifāya. 21 Before al-Bāqillānī, we find the earliest known precedent for this approach to content criticism in the writings of the Ḥanafī judge ʿĪsā b. Abān (d. 221/836). In a work rebutting the controversial Muslim rationalist Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833) as well as al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn Abān elaborated the three-fold division of reports and stated that the early Muslim community (salaf) rejected āḥād (non-widely transmitted) reports that either contradict the Qurʾān or established sunna (sunna thābita), or describe an event that would have been more widely reported had it really occurred. He also makes the ultimate arbiter for judging the veracity of a report the verdict of reason (ijtihād), not the isnād.
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Although he seems to have been largely unknown to early ḥadīth critics, ʿĪsā b. Abān was a member of the Ḥanafī tradition that was anathema to ahl al-sunna ḥadīth scholars, had written a rebuttal of al-Shāfiʿī and upheld that bête noire of the ahl al-ḥadīth: a belief that the Qurʾān was created. Bāqillānī's rationalist criteria for content criticism appealing in the 5th/11th century, but it is difficult to imagine that earlier anti-ahl al-raʾy critics like Ibn Ḥanbal or al-Bukhārī would have looked to Ibn Abān and other members of the ahl al-raʾy for methods of content criticism. Moreover, al-Khaṭīb's list of content criticism principles seems out of place even in his own work. Not once does he apply them openly in his Kifāya. Nor have I found him reject a ḥadīth based on the criteria he lays out in the Kifāya in his analyses of the numerous ḥadīths he identifies as forged in his Tārīkh Baghdād. 26 He also presents his own list of criteria for content criticism, largely drawn from the works of Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn ʿArrāq. As examples, however, he draws on ḥadīths criticized by the 8th/14th-century scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). 27 Ultimately, he can trace this approach back no further than al-Khaṭīb's al-Kifāya. 28 Remarkably, Luqmān al-Salafī and the Indian Ḥamza al-Malībārī have been the only modern Muslim scholars to provide any evidence for content criticism from the early ḥadīth tradition, and we will note their contribution presently. , and I will not inform anyone after you." Al-Fasawī objects that "this is impossible (muḥāl), and I fear that it is forged (kadhib)." He adds that ʿUmar is one of the veterans of the the Battle of Badr, who the Qurʾān announced had all attained salvation, and the Prophet had also said that if there were to be another prophet after him it would be ʿUmar. Explicit Content Criticism by Ḥadīth Scholars in the 4th/10th Century e following are instances of content criticism from books of transmitter criticism and ḥadīth collections written in the 4th/10th century. 
From the
Aḥwāl al-rijāl of Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Yaʿqūb al-

From the Works of Ibn Ḥibbān al-Bustī (d. 354/965):
-We also find an instance of content criticism in the ṣaḥīḥ collection of the 4th/10th-century ḥadīth critic Ibn Ḥibbān. Here, the author categorically rejects all ḥadīths that describe how the Prophet would bind a rock tightly against his stomach with a cloth to ward off the pangs of hunger while fasting. In one report, the Prophet instructs Muslims not to follow his example in fasting parts of the months before and after Ramaḍān consecutively with the holy month: "Indeed I am not like any of you, I am fed and given drink [by God] (innī lastu ka-aḥadikum innī uṭʿamu wa usqā)." Ibn Ḥibbān explains that any report in which the Prophet is forced to extreme measures by hunger would entail that God had let His prophet go hungry-a notion that contradicts the ḥadīth. Moreover, Ibn Ḥibbān adds that the correct wording of the rock-tying reports is not 'rock (ḥajar),' but rather 'ḥajaz,' or the end of the loincloth (izār). He adds, "And a rock does not ward off hunger." to examine the contents of a ḥadīth in their attempt to determine its authenticity. Among them, we find a clear awareness of historical anachronism, a sensitivity to logical impossibility and, most prominently, a clear vision of the historical, legal and dogmatic baselines against which individual reports should be judged. AlBukhārī 'knew' that the Prophet had not appointed a successor, that he would be the first intercessor for the Muslims on the Day of Judgment, and that he had established fixed points for the beginning of the pil grimage. Al-Bukhārī also reacted skeptically to a report in which the Prophet supposedly predicted events which, if the report were true, would have already materialized. Muslim used the historical 'reality' established when ḥadīths had "been widely transmitted (tawātarat)" or by "the manifest prevalence (taẓāhur) of authentic reports from the Messenger of God (ṣ)" to identify and isolate contradictory minority reports transmitted through only one or two narrations. 52 We can perceive the limits of al-Fasawī's 'thinkable thought' in his refusal to accept that ʿUmar could entertain the possibility of being a hypocrite. Al-Jūzajānī quotes Ibn al-Mubārak plainly rejecting a ḥadīth because it contradicts sense perception and his experience.
Content criticism would seem to be a fundamental component in transmitter evaluation-a purveyor of ḥadīths with unacceptable mean ings could be deemed unreliable on the basis of what he transmitted. Ibn ʿAdī often states that the questionable ḥadīths that a certain transmitter narrates "demonstrate that he is unreliable." so infrequently? If content criticism constituted part of these scholars' critical apparatus, why is it so hard to find in surviving texts of transmitter criticism? To answer this question we must turn to the intellectual milieu of the Islamic Near East in the formative period of Sunni ḥadīth criticism.
e Ahl al-ḥadīth and Muslim Rationalists
Few features of Islamic intellectual history are as well known as the conflict between the school of thought that espoused a reliance on material transmitted from the early Muslim community to elaborate Islamic law and dogma (the self-proclaimed ahl al-ḥadīth) and those who either favored a more selective use of ḥadīth combined with a reliance on independent legal reasoning (called the ahl al-raʾy by the ahl al-ḥadīth and generally associated with the Ḥanafī tradition) or those who leaned towards the Hellenistic rationalist tradition (dubbed the ahl al-kalām, including the Muʿtazilites and other ra tionalists such as the Jahmiyya).
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Here we will not attempt a taxonomy of these different schools in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries, as we are only concerned with the ahl al-ḥadīth's perception of their adversaries. It is enough to say that these schools of thought had fundamentally different approaches to elaborating Islamic law and dogma, but that their rhetoric and stances were sharpened and exacerbated by their constant, vicious sparring with one another. For their opponents, the ahl al-ḥadīth were brainless literalists, clinging absurdly to transmitted reports whose true meaning they did not understand but over whose isnāds they obsessed endlessly. To the ahl al-ḥadīth, the ahl al-raʾy and ahl al-kalām were arrogant heretics who abandoned the documented precedent of the Prophet for the musings of their own frail minds. Each group created a cult of methodology; the ahl alkalām glorified the ability of reason to determine the proper interpretations of the sources of revelation, and the ahl al-ḥadīth sacralized the isnād as the only means to guarantee a pure under standing of the Prophet's Islam and rise above the heresies of the human mind. Here we will concern ourselves only with the role of the isnād and content criticism in this conflict.
As Josef van Ess has shown, Muʿtazilites such as ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd (d. 144/761) accepted ḥadīths as a source of Islamic law and dogma but insisted on content criticism as the only suitable means to judge their authenticity. 56 e Muʿtazilite master al-Naẓẓām (d. ca. 220-30/835-45) thus gave no credit to the number of narrations or attestations of a ḥadīth; only an examination of the meaning of a report could affirm its authenticity, and "the means of rational proof (jihat ḥujjat ʿaql) could abrogate (tansakhu) transmitted reports."
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For the Muʿtazilites and other rationalist groups such as the Jahmiyya, the Qurʾān and human reason were the chief tools for content criticism. As the literal words of God, the legal and dogmatic principles laid out in the Qurʾān provided the ideal criteria for determining the contours of the faith and its community. e rationalists' chief justification for the use of the Qurʾān as a criterion in their debates with the ahl al-ḥadīth was a report in which the Prophet states, "When a ḥadīth comes to you from me, compare it to the Book of God, and if it agrees with it then accept it, and if it differs with it, leave it (idhā jāʾakum al-ḥadīth fa'riḍūhu ʿalā kitāb Allāh wa in wāfaqahu fa-khudhūhu wa in khālafahu fa- If not for rational discussion (kalām), religions would never be upheld for God, and we would never have been able to distinguish ourselves from the atheists (mulḥidīn), and there would be no distinction between truth and falsehood, nor a separation between a true prophet and a pretender. Real proof (ḥujja) would never have stood out from specious argument (al-ḥīla), strong indication from ambiguity.
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Even when Muʿtazilites such as Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balkhī (d. 319/931) began in-depth studies of ḥadīth in order to combat their ahl al-ḥadīth opponents on their own terms, content criticism and the role of reason remained central to the Muʿtazilite school. In his work on ḥadīth criticism, the Qubūl al-akhbār, al-Balkhī explains that the requirements for a good ḥadīth are that it accord with the Qurʾān, with the sunna that has been agreed upon by the umma or the early Muslim community, and finally with "the principles of God's justice (ʿadl) and Unicity (tawḥīd), which cannot be challenged or changed by anyone." In this final case, he recognizes that ḥadīths 
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For the Muʿtazilites and other, more extreme rationalists, a reliance on the isnād to authenticate ḥadīths was preposterous. Ibn Qutayba describes how the ahl al-kalām would mock the ahl al-ḥadīth for heaping accolades on one another for their knowledge of the different narrations (ṭuruq) of ḥadīths without understanding their basic meaning or even their grammar. e ahl al-kalām's mantra was, he said, "e stupider the muḥaddith, the more prominent and trusted he is among them." 62 In a story that appears in a much later Muʿtazilite source, the Ṭabaqāt al-muʿtazila of Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 839/1437), the scion of the school, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/915-16), is asked to evaluate two ḥadīths narrated through the same isnād. Al-Jubbāʾī authenticates the first ḥadīth, which prohibits women from marrying their aunts' husbands (lā tankiḥu al-marʾa ʿalā ʿammatihā wa lā ʿalā khālatihā). But he rejects as false the second ḥadīth, in which Adam bests Moses in an argument over predestination by telling him that no one has the right to blame Adam or Eve for their expulsion from Paradise, since God had willed this act of disobedience (this ḥadīth contradicts the Muʿtazilite belief in free will). When his interlocutor asks him, "Two ḥadīths with the same isnād, you authenticate one and reject the other?", al-Jubbāʾī replies that the second one could not be the words of the Prophet because "the Qurʾān demonstrates its falsity, as does the consensus of the Muslims and the evidence of reason." 63 In his Taʾwīl mukhtalif al-ḥadīth, Ibn Qutayba thus finds himself rebutting four general criticisms of ḥadīth by rationalists: 3 it is contradicted by rational investigation (al-naẓar), which usually involves the ḥadīth having some unacceptable legal or dogmatc implications. 4 it is contradicted by rational proof (ḥujjat ʿaql), which generally means it clashes with some notion of what is acceptable or possible according to the precepts of reason or the basic tenets of the Muslim rationalist worldview.
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In their polemics against rationalists, the ahl al-ḥadīth lept on this contempt for the isnād and reliance on human reason. Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣbahānī (d. 430/1038) narrates a report in which the Muʿtazilite ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd was presented with a ḥadīth whose meaning he found un acceptable. ʿAmr rejects each step in the isnād: 
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In another polemic against ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd, al-Dāraquṭnī reports that the Muʿtazilite had heard the ḥadīth of Bahz b. Ḥakīm that "a man ordered his family, if he died, to burn him and then scatter his ashes on a windy day" so that God could never find him to exact retribution on him for his sins. ʿAmr said, "e Messenger of God (ṣ) did not say that!" He continued, "and if he did say it, I would not believe him (fa-anā bihi mukadhdhib), and if disbelieving in it were a sin, then I would repeat it!" For the ahl al-ḥadīth, only by submitting oneself completely to the uncorrupted ways of the early Muslim community as transmitted though the isnād can one truly obey God and His Messenger. Unlike the ahl al-kalām, whom they saw as arrogantly glorifying the capacity of human reason, or the ahl al-raʾy, whom they viewed as rejecting or accepting ḥadīths arbitrarily when it suited their legal opinion, 67 the ahl al-ḥadīth perceived themselves as "cultivating the ways of the Messenger, fending off [heretical innovation and lies] from revealed knowledge (al-ʿilm)." 68 To question the rational acceptability of a report was to allow the human mind too much free rein in defining religion; if a report could be traced to the Prophet, Muslims should hear and obey. Because it clashed with the ahl al-ḥadīth position that ḥadīths could abrogate or modify Qurʾānic rulings, the Muʿtazilite ḥadīth instructing Muslims to compare reports attributed to the Prophet with the Qurʾān was uniformly rejected as inauthentic by Sunni ḥadīth scholars. 69 In the Sunan of al-Nasāʾī We do not resort except to that which the Messenger of God (ṣ) resorted. And we do not reject what has been transmitted authentically from him because it does not accord with our conjectures (awhāminā) or seem correct to reason… we hope that in this lies the path to salvation and escape from the baseless whims of heresy (ahwāʾ). 72 (my emphasis)
e centerpiece of the ḥadīth scholars cult of the isnād has been Ibn al-Mubārak's famous statement when confronted by ḥadīths forged by heretics (zanādiqa): "for me the isnād is part of religion; if not for the isnād, anyone who wanted could say whatever he wanted. But if it is said to him 'who told you that?' he cannot respond (baqiya)." 73 Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj also quotes Ibn al-Mubārak as saying, "Between us and the [early] community there are props, namely the isnād (baynanā wa bayn al-qawm al-qawāʾim yaʿnī alisnād)." 74 Ibn ʿAdī cites Ibn ʿAbbās as saying, "Indeed this knowledge is [our] religion, so incline towards ḥadīths as long as they have isnāds to your Prophet (inna hādhā al-ʿilm dīn fa'ḥibbū al-ḥadīth mā usnida ilā nabiyyikum)."
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Only a reliable isnād can protect Muslims from embracing material that might be the forgeries of heretics. Al-Shāfiʿī is frequently quoted by the ahl al-ḥadīth and later Sunnis as warning, "e person who seeks knowledge without an isnād (in another version: who does not ask 'where is this from?)', indeed, he is like a person gathering wood at night. He carries on his back a bundle of wood when there may be a viper in it that could bite him." 76 e cult of the isnād became so intense in the self-portrayal of the ahl al-ḥadīth that it was reported that Ibn Ḥanbal would not accept the habit of praising God before telling his doctor of any ailments he had without an isnād establishing this practice. from the bonds of religion. If the isnād is authentic, the ḥadīth is authentic. 78 What would be the consequences of conceding, as alJubbāʾī claimed, that even if an isnād is perfect, the message it transmits may be forged? It would no longer be possible to trust the isnād, and the whole cult of authenticity built by the ahl alḥadīth on the foundation of the isnād would collapse.
As the examples of content criticism demonstrate, however, there were some reports whose meanings were patently unacceptable to ahl al-ḥadīth scholars like al-Bukhārī and Muslim. How could the ahl al-ḥadīth reconcile rejecting a ḥadīth for an unacceptable meaning with their obsession with the isnād? Simply put, if there can be no problem in the contents of a ḥadīth with a perfect isnād, then a problem in the contents of the ḥadīth must mean that there is a problem in the isnād. Although he does not follow his argument to its logical conclusion, Luqmān al-Salafī alludes to this while arguing that early ḥadīth critics did not separate isnād criticism from content criticism. Authenticating the matn of a ḥadīth was the goal of isnād criticism, he reminds us, adding perceptively that if a critic like al-Bukhārī found a problematic matn, he would explain the problem in terms of the isnād.
79 Ḥamza al-Malībārī agrees that when a critic like ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/849) declared that an isnād was ṣaḥīḥ, it meant that every link in the isnād had accurately and honestly reported from the person before him. "So that es tablishes that the Prophet (ṣ) said [that ḥadīth], and it could never be correct that the isnād is authentic and the matn weak (ḍaʿīf)." In the most rigorous Western study of early ḥadīth criticism, Eerik Dickinson stops just short of identifying why content criticism is disguised in the early period. "For the critics," he states, "the authenticity of a ḥadīth depended on the reliability of its transmitters." "[I]f a ḥadīth was unauthentic," he continues, "it was because someone had either distorted or forged it. erefore, if a ḥadīth was to be rejected, one of its transmitters had to be labeled as unreliable." 81 Here Dickinson seems to build on John Burton's insightful but vague comment that a ḥadīth scholar who disapproved of the meaning of a report "might tend more usually" to find a flaw in the isnād. 82 We should thus not be surprised by the scarcity of explicit content criticism in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries. Perceiving themselves as locked in a bitter conflict with rationalist opponents who insisted that content criticism was the only means by which ḥadīths could be authenticated, ahl al-ḥadīth scholars like al-Bukhārī could not concede to their opponents that the examination of a ḥadīth's contents is an independent venue of criticism. Instead, they reduced content criticism to a mere function of criticizing the isnād. A flawed meaning was a symptom of a problem in the isnād, not the disease itself. All but two of the above examples of explicit content criticism thus appear in conjunction with isnād criticisms. trying to decipher it. 83 A common phrase used by critics in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries to criticize a report attributed to the Prophet, 'not accepted (munkar),' could mean that the report was reliable but was narrated by only one chain of transmission, that this version of the ḥadīth narrated through a certain isnād was unreliable but other authentic versions existed, or that the report was entirely forged. 84 In this last case, however, even concluding that the term munkar denotes 'forged' does not necessarily mean that the critic found the meaning of the ḥadīth in question unacceptable. As Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 463/1070) would explain, "how many ḥadīths are there with a weak isnād but a correct meaning (rubb ḥadīth ḍaʿīf al-isnād ṣaḥīḥ al-maʿnā)?"
85 When al-Bukhārī states that a report narrated by ʿAlī from the Prophet that "I am the abode of wisdom and ʿAlī is its door" is 'munkar,' we cannot know whether al-Bukhārī objects to the pro-Shiite meaning of the ḥadīth or merely to that particular isnād, since the report is also narrated from the Prophet by other Companions. 86 On its own, then, the term munkar could signify either isnād or content criticism.
Although very frustrating to Western historians and later Muslim scholars alike, this ambiguity dovetails exactly with the efforts of early ḥadīth critics to conceal content criticism from opponents who sought to legitimize it as the sole means for authenticating ḥadīths. By utilizing technical terms that made content criticism and isnād criticism indistinguishable from one another, ḥadīth critics were able to maintain their façade of a total reliance on the isnād and their purported boycott of rational criticism.
If we hypothesize that content criticism took place in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries under the guise of isnād criticism or am biguous terminology such as 'munkar,' one would expect a strong correlation between the ḥadīths mentioned in early books on transmitter criticism and those later listed as forgeries in books of mawḍūʿāt when that genre blossomed in the 6th/12th century. Furthermore, if we assume some significant degree of continuity in what Sunni ḥadīth critics considered unacceptable contents, then we should expect that a large portion of the ḥadīths later criticized explicitly for content reasons were early on criticized for transmission flaws or labeled with such generic criticisms as 'munkar. ' Anecdotal evidence supports this hypothesis. In his entry on Ayyūb b. Khālid al-Anṣārī (fl. early 2nd/8th century) in the al-Tārīkh alkabīr, al-Bukhārī notes that Ayyūb narrated from ʿAbdallāh b. Rāfiʿ, from Abū Hurayra that the Prophet said, "God created the earth (turba) on Saturday." Al-Bukhārī adds that Abū Hurayra did not hear this ḥadīth from the Prophet, but rather that it was the words In his al-Tārīkh al-awsaṭ and al-Tārīkh al-kabīr, al-Bukhārī criticizes for isnād reasons another ḥadīth that would later become notorious for its objectionable contents. In his entry on Jābān b. ʿAbdallāh, he states that the ḥadīth "e child born of illicit sexual relations will not enter Heaven (lā yadkhulu al-janna walad al-zinā)" is not authentic because of two breaks in the isnād where the transmitters never met one another. 89 He rejects another narration of this ḥadīth through the Prophet's wife Maymūna in his entry on Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAmr (d. 145/762-63), again for isnād reasons. 90 is ḥadīth has other narrations as well, but they were also undermined by al-Bukhārī's contemporaries. His teacher ʿAlī b. alMadīnī dis missed a narration of this ḥadīth from ʿUthmān because two trans mitters in its isnād were unknown, while his student alNasāʾī reported widespread disagreement over the reliability of another isnād of the ḥadīth through Abū Hurayra. 91 is controversial ḥadīth subsequently attracted tremendous content criticism. Abū al-Khayr Aḥmad al-Ṭāliqānī (d. 590/1194) recounts that in 576/1180 an energetic discussion about this ḥadīth broke out among students at the Baghdad Niẓāmiyya; a party of the jurists who were present insisted that it was forged because it violated the Qurʾānic principle that "no bearer of burdens bears the burdens of another." 92 96 Ibn ʿAdī mentions the ḥadīth as an example of the uncorroborated reports transmitted by Muʿāwiya b. Yaḥyā al-Aṭrābulsī (fl. mid 2nd/8th century). 97 Later, this ḥadīth regularly appeared in books of mawḍūʿāt. 98 It was Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, however, who declared that this ḥadīth was "refuted by sense perception (ḥass)." For how many people have lied while sneezing? 99 is content criticism has been echoed by al-Zarkashī, al-Sakhāwī, and Mullā ʿAlī Qārī. 100 Beyond such anecdotal evidence, we find a strong statistical correlation between ḥadīths criticized either for isnād reasons in books of transmitter criticism or ambiguously as munkar, and the ḥadīths found in later books of mawḍūʿāt. In a random sample I made of 100 of the 1119 ḥadīths in the earliest surviving mawḍūʿāt book, the Tadhkirat of the Mahdī will be from the family of the Prophet. Instead, he produced an obscure ḥadīth stating, "ere is no messiah except Jesus the son of Mary." 104 Al-Jawzaqānī's dismissal of material otherwise considered reliable by mainstream Sunnism explains why his collection contains so many previously unnoticed 'forgeries.' AlJawzaqānī's reliance on the transmitter-criticism paradigm, however, is nonetheless obvious in his Kitāb al-abāṭīl; for every ḥadīth he rejects except one, he justifies his decision by recourse to criticisms of the isnād or its transmitters. 105 e Kitāb al-mawḍūʿāt of Ibn al-Jawzī, one of the most famous books of forged ḥadīths, continues this trend of reliance on earlier books of transmitter criticism. Because he provides full isnāds for all the ḥadīths he judges to be forged, we can see exactly what sources he consulted. In the first volume of the three-volume 1966-68 Medina edition of the work, the isnāds of 44% of the ḥadīths that Ibn al-Jawzī rejects lead back directly through the weak transmitter works of Ibn ʿAdī, Ibn Ḥibbān, al-ʿUqaylī, al-Ḥākim or Abū al-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Azdī (d. 374/985). is statistic does not even count the ḥadīths that Ibn al-Jawzī criticizes and occurred in these earlier works but whose isnāds Ibn al-Jawzī did not trace back to the Prophet directly through the books.
In the first mawḍūʿāt book based solely on content criticism, the Manār al-munīf of Ibn al-Qayyim, the foundational role of the early books of transmitter criticism is equally prominent. Of fifty ḥadīths that I selected at random from the book, 62% are also found in our afore-mentioned selection of earlier books of transmitter criticism.
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Of course, what one ḥadīth critic sees as a blatant contradiction between a report and the established tenets of Islam another may easily reconcile. Just because Ibn al-Qayyim considered a ḥadīth that debases blacks to be unacceptable because it did not befit the Prophet, we cannot be sure that Ibn Ḥanbal deemed it munkar in 104) Al the 3rd/9th century for the same reason. 107 e high correlation between books listing forged ḥadīths (mawḍūʿāt) and the ḥadīths that earlier trans mitter books included as exhibits of the weak material narrated by individuals they listed, however, strongly suggests that the authors of the mawḍūʿāt books treated the books of transmitter criticism as storehouses of problematic ḥadīths. e high correlation between the first book strictly devoted to content criticism and this selection of earlier books of transmitter criticism also strongly suggests that scholars like al-Bukhārī and Ibn ʿAdī included an appreciable number of ḥa dīths in their books for content reasons (again, this assumes a signi ficant degree of diachronic continuity in what ḥadīth critics considered unacceptable contents).
One might claim that such a correlation between later books of forged ḥadīths and early books of transmitter criticism is meaningless-later critics might have felt that they could only bring overt content criticism to bear on ḥadīths that earlier scholars had already critiqued for isnād reasons in their books of transmitter criticism. is is not the case, however, since the authors of mawḍūʿāt books drew the ḥadīths they criticized on the basis of content from a wide range of respected sources, such as the Musnad of Ibn Ḥanbal, the Jāmiʿ of al-Tirmidhī and even (although rarely) the Ṣaḥīḥayn. 108 Nor did later critics limit themselves only to previously criticized material. Some identified problems in a ḥadīth's contents in spite of an admittedly flawless isnād. Discussing the Shiite ḥadīths of one narrator, al-Dhahabī reacts to the ḥadīth "If they take ʿAlī as a leader (wallū) then he is a guide, guided [by God] (mahdī)" by noting that, although the ḥadīth has an established (maḥfūẓ) isnād in Ibn Ḥanbal's Musnad, he cannot accept it. He asserts, "I do not know of any criticism of it, but the report is munkar."
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Conclusion
Since the landmark contributions of Goldziher, Western scholars of Islam have generally accepted his conclusion that early Muslim ḥadīth critics looked only at the isnād and not the matn of ḥadīths to discern their authenticity. When Western and modern Muslim scholars have argued that early critics did in fact take the contents of ḥadīths into consideration, they have relied on material of either dubious historical reliability or imported into the ḥadīth tradition from the fields of speculative theology and legal theory long after the formative period of Sunni ḥadīth criticism in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries.
I am not suggesting that ḥadīth critics like al-Bukhārī or Ibn Ḥanbal were forerunners of the Historical Critical Method. As generations of Western scholars have demonstrated, even the revered Ṣaḥīḥayn are replete with anachronistic reports that grew out of the political, legal and sectarian feuds of the first two centuries of Islam. But we need not, and indeed cannot, explain why al-Bukhārī or Muslim saw the contents of one anachronistic ḥadīth as unacceptable while approving of another similarly anachronistic report. e fact that early ḥadīth critics do not seem to have applied content criticism as modern historians would construe it does not mean that they did not apply it at all. Indeed, the fifteen examples provided here from established texts of the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th century disprove the extreme claim of Goldziher and others. Far from having "no feeling for even the crudest anachronisms provided that the isnād is correct,"
110 the examples indicate that al-Bukhārī, Muslim, al-Fasawī, al-Jūzajānī, Ibn Khuzayma and Ibn Ḥibbān were able and willing to practice content criticism. In their work we see a sensitivity to historical anachronism, logical impossibility, limits of 'thinkable thought' and 109) Al-Dhahabī, Mīzān, 2:612-3. 110) Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:140-1. a rejection of material that contradicts what they 'knew' to be historically, dogmatically and legally true.
e high correlation (between 45% and 95%) between later collections of forged ḥadīths and books of transmitter criticism from this early period strongly suggests that critics like al-Bukhārī and Ibn Ḥibbān were rejecting ḥadīths for content reasons even when they did not make this explicitly clear. Indeed, content criticism may well have been more of a rule than an exception. ese critics' sensitivities to anachronism and logical inconsistency are undeniably attested to in the examples provided, and it seems as unlikely that they could have simply deactivated those critical filters as us modern historians consistently ignoring suspicious contents while conducting our own research. Certainly, a belief in the Prophet's foreknowledge of future events could mitigate the need for content criticism, but at minimum it seems impossible that the examples given in this article represent the only instances of content criticism in the early ḥadīth tradition.
e reason why these early critics so rarely made this content criticism obvious is understandable. ey felt themselves locked in a terrible struggle with rationalists who mocked their reliance on the isnād and saw content criticism as the only true means of evaluating the authenticity of ḥadīths. To acknowledge a problem in the meaning of a ḥadīth without arriving at that conclusion through an analysis of the isnād would affirm the rationalist me thodology. For this reason, content criticism had to be concealed in the language of isnād criticism.
Proving the existence of content criticism in the early period and explaining why it is not more evident complements our understanding of early Islamic legal thought. In his Ikhtilāf al-ḥadīth and his Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī suggested that it is possible to reconcile two reliable ḥadīths whose meanings seem incompatible. 111 When the contents of a ḥadīth proved irretrievably incompatible with what al-Shāfiʿī considered the established truth, however, he resorted to criticizing or impugning its isnād.
112 Like al-Bukhārī and the other ḥadīth critics, 
